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An Anaphoric Account of Stage-Level Predicates
Theodore B. Fernald
Swarthmore College

1.

Introduction'

This paper presents evidence that discourse anaphora can be introduced by stagelevel predicates but not by individual-level predicates. A dyoamic account is developed
which draws on unexplored asswnptions in Kratzer's (1989) proposal, in particular that the
difference between individual- and stage-level predicates is a type-theoretic one. 'This typetheoretic difference provides the added benefit of resolving a compositionality puzzle
involving perceptual reports and augmented absolute adjuncts.
2.

Background

The distinction between individual- and stage-level predicates (hereafter ILPs and
SLPs) is evident in a wide variety of English sentence types. The existential construction
in (1) and (2) (Milsark 1974) and perceptual reports in (3) and (4) show a contrast in
grammaticality:
(l)

a. There were people sick.
b. There were people drunk.
c. There were doors open.

(2)

a. "There were people intelligent.
b. *There were people tall.
c. "There were doors wooden.

(3)

a. Martha saw a policemen available.
b. 1 saw Sam tower over his friends.

(4)

a. "Martha saw a policemen intelligent.
b. *1 saw Sam taller than his friends.

• For valuable discussion of the Ideas in this paper I would like to thank Greg Carlson, Donka Farkas,
Sheila Glasbey, Manfred Krifka, Gerhard Jaeger, Bill Ladusaw, Carlota Smith, and the participants of
NELS. I alone arn responsible for any errors.
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The examples in (1) and (3) contain SLPs and are grammatical; (2) and (4) contain ILPs
and are ungrammatical Indefinite subjects also show a contrast in acceptability (Milsark
1974). The SLPs in (5) are grammatical, and the aps in (6) are less acceptable:
(5)

a. Sm people were sick.
b. A man was drunk.

(6)

a. nSm people were tall. (cf. Some of the people were tall.)
b. ??A man was intelligent (cf. All men were intelligent.)

Bare plural subjects (Carlson 1977), shown in (7), and the free and absolute adjuncts in (813) (Stump 1985) show a contrast in interpretation between ILPs and SLPs:
(7)

a. People were clever in those days.
G,[person(x)] I clever(x)]
b. People were hungry.
3x[person(x) & hungry(x)] or G,[person(x)] [hungry(x)]

As seen above, only SLPs allow a bare plural subject to have an existential interpretation.
(8) and (9) are examples of free adjuncts. The fIrst member of each pair has a SLP in the
adjunct, and a kind of conditional interpretation is possible. This interpretation is not
possible with the ILPs in the second member of each pair:

(8)

a. Standing on a chair, Lisa's head touches the ceiling.
b. Having long legs, Lisa's head touches the ceiling.

(9)

a. Standing on a chair, John can touch the ceiling
b. Having unusually long arms, John can touch the ceiling.

The examples below contain augmented absolute adjuncts, as Stump (1985) called them.
(10) and (11) contain SLPs and the conditional interpretation is possible, but (12) and (13)
contain ILPs in the adjunct, and no conditional interpretation is possible:
(10)

a. With her hair braided, Jane reminds us of Mary.
b. With her children asleep, Mary watches TV.
c. With his work done, John goes straight to bed.

(11)

a. With the truck in fIrst gear, we would coast gently downhill.
b. With her hair braided, Jane must resemble Mary.
c. With the children asleep, Mary might watch TV.

(12)

a. With his mother being a doctor, John knows the way to the Med Center.
b. With the water being a little cold, the children stay on the beach.
c. With his arm being in a cast, Bill is not asked to participate.

(13)

a. With his mother being a doctor, John would know the way to the Med Center.
b. With the water being a little cold, the children must stay on the beach.
c. With his arm being in a cast, Bill might not be asked to participate.

When adjuncts also show a contrast in interpretation (Carlson 1977, Farkas &
Sugioka 1983, Kratzer 1989, de Hoop & de Swart 1989). Kratzer (1989) used (14b&c) to
argue that (14a) is a violation of the prohibition against vacuous quantifIcation shown in
(15). The fact that (14d) is acceptable is taken as evidence that SLPs have an implicit
argument that aps do not have.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/8
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(14)

a. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well.
*0 [knows (Mary, French)] [knows well (Mary, French)]
b. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well.
0x[Moroccan(x) & knows (x, French)] [knows well (x, French)]
c. When Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it well.
Ox [foreign language(x) & knows (Mary, x)] [knows well (Mary ,x)]
d. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well.
O,[speaks (Mary, French,I)] [speaks well (Mary, French, I)]
e. *When Mary speaks French, she knows it well.
. *O,[speaks (Mary, French)] [knows well (Mary, French)]

(15)

Prohibition against vacuous quantification (Kratzer 1989)
For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an occurrence
of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope.

Thus, Kratzer proposes the interpretations in (16b) and (17b) for the sentences in (16a) and
(17a).
(16)

a. Manon is dancing.
b. dancing(m, I)

(17)

a. Manon is a dancer.
b. dancer (m)

Kratzer's analysis is built entirely around a syntactic theory of argument structure.
SLPs have a spatiotemporallocation as the external argument, forcing subjects of SLPs to
be VP-intemal. The additional assumption that VP is the domain of existential closure
allows this proposal to capture the basic facts about the interpretation of indefinite subjects
very nicely.
Completely uninvestigated in Kratzer's paper are the type-theoretic consequences of
positing the logical representations in (16) and (17). (18) and (19) show Kratzer's
argument structures along with the logical type of the predicate classes:
(18)

(19)

Stage-level predicates
dance
hit

Argument structure
<location, agent>
<location, agent, theme>

Type

Individual-level predicates
be intelligent
own

<experiencer>
<owner, owned>

<e,!>
<e,<e,!»

<l,<e,!»
<e,<l,<e,t»>

This paper investigates some of the type-theoretic consequences of this proposal,
focusing on the temporal portion of the spatiotemporal and ignoring the spatio part. I will
show that this type-theoretic distinction can resolve a compositionality challenge posed by
perceptual reports and absolute adjuncts and that the same basis for the ILP/SLP distinction
can be used to provide an account of donkey anaphoric effects found with SLPs but not
ILPs.

3.

Nonuniformity

As I've argued elsewhere (Fernald in press), it is evident from the work of many
researchers that the ILP/SLP distinction is due to several properties that overlap
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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substantially, but not perfectly. This paper focuses on one of those properties -- a
correlation between SLPs and deictic and anaphoric uses of tense. The diagnostics for the
ILP/SLP distinction are also affected by a plurality condition on generic quantification (see
deHoop & de Swart 1989), issues of compositionality (Fernald in press), a specificity
effect (Glasbey 1997, Fernald 1994, in press), coercion, and an inference of an
interruption in the temporal interval over which an ILP is taken to hold of a subject
(Schubert & Pelletier 1989, Krifka et al. 1995, Moens & Steedman 1988, Fernald 1994,
1996, in press). In addition, it may be affected by distinction between thetic and
categorical judgments (see Ladusaw 1994, McNally 1998). and other factors.

4.

The Deictic and Anaphoric Nature of SLPs

Donkey sentences are a classical problem in semantics. Problems arise if indefinite
nominals are interpreted as having their own existential quantifiers within their basic
interpretations, as assumed in Montague, for example. Thus. (20a) cannot be interpreted
as (21a) since the variable x in the expression beat (x,y) cannot be bound by the existential
quantifier; and both variables in beat (x,y) in (21 b) are outside the scopes of the quantifiers.
So the formulas in (21) are ill-formed, but if these variables were bound to any quantifiers
with wider scope, incorrect interpretations would result.
(20)

a.

b.
(21)

a.

b.

Every farmer who has a donkey beats it.
(Geach 1962)
If a farmer has a donkey, he beats it.
+'</y [farmer (y) & 3x[donkey (x) & own (y,x)] ~ beat (y,x)]]
+3y [farmer (y) & 3x[donkey (x) & own (y,x)]]~ beat (y,x)

Strawson (1952) pointed out that the it in (22) is understood as referring to whatever dog
was introduced in the first sentence, but that interpreting it as an ordinary variable will
result in it being unbound since the scope of the existential quantifier introduced by a dog is
confined to the formula corresponding to the sentence in which that nominal appears:
(22)

A dog came into the room. It flopped down. (Strawson 1952)
3x [dog(x) & came-into-the-room (x)]
flopped-down(x)

A rich tradition in dynamic Montague semantics (Groenendijk & Stockhof 1990) and
discourse representation theory (Kamp 1981) has arisen to account for these and related
phenomena. There are many varieties of dynamic semantics. For concreteness, my
proposal will assume one of the earliest and most widely available versions, that of
Groenendijk & Stockhof (1990).1
In Dynamic Semantics, utterances are interpreted as context change potential. In
Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG) this is formalized as a mapping from states to states,
where a state is an assignment of values to discourse marlcers. Nominal expressions are
interpreted using discourse markers rather than directly using variables. Lower case d
indicates a discourse marker in the formulations below; {xld) is called a state-switcher
which has the effect of assigning the value x to a discourse marker d. The definitions of
DMG that are crucial for this paper are shown in (23-29).

(23)
(24)

Dynamic Existential Quantifier Edif> = Ap 3x [xld)(if>(P)). where x and p have no
free occurrences in if>.
S.tatic Universal Quantifier rid if>= -Ed-if>

I There are some well-known shortComings to this system of assumptions - see Chierchia (1992) for
some of them. My proposal will naturally have the same shortcomings. but the purpose of this paper is to
show that part of the analysis SLPs must involve the analysis of donkey anaphora.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/8
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(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
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a. Uparrow i 1/1 = 'A.p [1/1" )], where 1/1 is an expression of type t, p a variable of
type <.s, t> which has no free occurrences in 1/1.
b. Downarrow t <II = <II ("true), where <II is an expression of type <<.s,t>,t>.
Static Negation -<II = i...,.j, <II
Dynamic Conjunction <II; 'I' = 'A.p [<II("('I' (P»)], where p has no free occurrences
in either <II or '¥.
Sentence sequencing: 1/1. ljI is interpreted as 1/1' ; ljI'
Restrictive relative clauses: a CN + /3s is interpreted as Ax[ a'(x); /31
A crucial property of state switchers: (ald}(/3(Y)
is equivalent with
(ald}/3({ald}y)

Sample basic expressions are shown below:
(30)

Basic expressions of DMG:
Ax ifanner (x)
Ax i walk (x)

farmer ~
walk ~
~

~

everyi ~

'A.P 'A.Q &di ['P(di) ; ~Q(di)]' where d i is novel
'A.P 'A.Q ~ ['P(di ) ~ ~Q(dj) ]

fIOj

~

'A.pf...Q~j ['P(d j ) ~ -~Q(dj)]

hei

~

'A.QrQ(dj ) ], where dj is familiar

Johnj ~

'A.Q[{j1dj rQ(dj)]

These assumptions yield (3lb) as the interpretation of (3la). This formula is equivalent to
(3lc) and (3Id).
(31)

a.
b.

c.
d.

Every fanner who has a donkey beats it.
~l [[ifanner (d l ) ; U2[ i donkey (d2) ; i own (d2)(d l )]]
~ ibeat (d~(dl)]
'A.p '<Ix '<Iy (x/d l ) {yld2 )[farmer (d l ) & 3x[donkey (d2 ) & own (d2)(d l )]
beat (d~ (dl)],,"P]
'A.p '<Ix '<Iy[fanner (x) & 3x[donkey (y) & own (y)(x)]
-7 beat(y) (x)] ""P]

To get the truth conditions for (3la), we can apply the down arrow operator to (3ld). This
will result in the tautologous proposition saturating the formula in (3ld).
Partee (1989), summarizing Bauerle (1979), von Stechow (1982), Hinrichs
(1981), Partee (1973), and Cooper (1986), points out that temporal and locative implicit
arguments behave like overt pronouns in having deictic, discourse anaphoric, and bound
variable characteristics. Thus:
(32)

a. Deictic or demonstrative: Who's he?
b. Discourse anaphoric: A woman walked in. She sat down.
c. Bound variable: Every man believed he was right.

(33)

(partee 1973)
a. Deictic past: Ididn't tum off the stove.
b. Discourse anaphoric past: Mary woke up sometime in the night. She turned on
the light

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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c. "Bound variable" past: Whenever John wrote a letter to Mary, she answered
two days later.
Partee concludes that tense is like a pronoun. Significantly, none of the examples in
Partee's work or the others cited bere involve ll..Ps. In fact, ll..Ps have none of these
characteristics:
(34)

a.
b.
c.

Sam was smart.
Sam was a professor. He was altruistic.
*Whenever Sam was a professor, he was altruistic.

(34a) has a deictic use like (33a) only if the predicate is coerced into being stage-level
through a pragmatic process I have elsewhere called Evidential Coercion2 (see Fernald
1994, 1996, in press). On such a reading, was sl1UUt is taken to mean 'gave evidence at a
spatiotemporal location of having the property denoted by the ll..P smart'. But the
WlCOerced ll..P reading of (34a) is not deictic in the way that (33a) is. Similarly, the
Wlcoerced readings for the (34b) lack the discourse anaphoric reading possible with the
SLPs in (33b). Finally, (34c) bas the same status as (33c). These sentences usually
appear in the literature with an ungramrnaticality star before them, although I usually think
this is a bit too strong. I take it, however, that to the extent that (34c) is acceptable, it is not
quantifying over event time, but the time at which the proposition in each clause is to be
eValuated. 3 All the sentences in (34) have tense in them, but they lack the similarity to
pronouns of the examples in (33) which contain SLPs. We conclude that tense is not
anaphoric or deictic except when it appears with SLPs. Dynamic semantics was designed
to deal with cases of discourse and bound variable anaphora like (33b&c).. Thus, an
analysis needs to be developed in which SLPs have dynamically-interpreted implicit
arguments.
A significant consequence of this analysis will be that the implicit temporal
arguments will be expected to pattern exactly with donkey anaphora. This prediction
appears to be successful:
(35)

a. When a womani speaks t French, sh~ speaks t it well. (Kratzer 1989)
b. A womani woket up sometime in the night. Shei turned t on the light
c. No on~ walked in. *H~ turned on the light.
d. No one walked t in. *Sam turned t on the light.
e. If a fanneri has a donkey, hei beats it. *Hei is upset.
f. If a fanner hast a donkey, he beatst it *Robin is upsett about this.

(35a) is a classical donkey sentence. (35b) shows that the implicit argument in the second
sentence can pick up the discourse referent used in the first sentence. The temporal
argument in the second sentence of (35c) cannot be interpreted as referring to locations of

2 Below is my statement of Evidential Coercion:

Evidential Coercion: Let u be an ILP with interpretation u'. u can be used as a SLP with the
following interpretation:
AlJ M3Q [Q(x,~) & G,J(Q(y,I»[(u'(y»))
Other kinds of coercion are relevant to the ILP/SLP diagnostics as well. See Fernald (in press) for details.
(i)

3 Tendencies to think that (34b) may involve a similar temporal reference I think also involve evaluation

time rather than any coerced event time. I discuss this further in Fernald (in press). but there is room for
further investigation.
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walking in. This parallels the inability of the overt pronoun he in the second sentence of
(35d) to pick up a referent from the fIrst sentence.
Finally, consider the pair in (35e) and (350. (35e) shows that. while the
conditional connective is internally dynamic, it is externally static. "That is, an indefinite
description contained in the antecedent of a conditional introduces a discourse referent that
can be picked up by an expression in the consequent (hence the connective in dynamic
within the sentence in which it appears); but the referent cannot be picked up by any
pronoun in a subsequent sentence (contrasting with the simple case in (35b» . Now we see
in (350 that the temporal argument of SLPs works exactly the same way. (350 is an
acceptable discourse, but not on an interpretation in which Robin's being upset coincides
with each instance of a farmer seeing and beating a donkey.

5.

Proposal

From the discussion above, I conclude that a dynamic analysis is needed for SLPs.
Since it is a consequence of Kratzer (1989) that SLPs and ILPs are of differing logical
type, I will propose that the extra spatioremporal argument of SLPs should be interpreted as
a discourse marker the way pronouns are in dynamic semantics. In this analysis, I assume
the type-theoretic distinction 4 shown in (36) and (37):
(36)

Stage-level predicates

dance

<l,<e,cc»
<e,<l,<e,cc»>

hit
(37)

Individual-level predicates
be intelligent
own

<e,cc>
<e,<e,cc»

These are the types implicitly assumed in Kratzer's analysis shown in (18) and (19) but
with CC, the type of propositions in dynamic semantics (mnemonic for 'context change' see Chierchia 1992), in place of t.
Variable
x, y
p
P,Q ,
T, U
t. I

Type
e

cc
<S,<e,cc»
<s,<l,<e,cc»>
1 (a sort of type e)

ILP
SLP

I assume that times are a sort of entity and so can be values for temporal sorts of discourse
markers without adding any machinery to DMG. I further assume that tense is what
introduces a temporal discourse marker (indicated by cl) that fills the extra argument
position of SLPs. (38) and (39) illustrate this:
(38)

Simple deictic past;. ~ A.T A.x[T(d\)(x) ; A.p 3ta (~ < Is & d\ = ta &"p]]

We could Just as easUy assume that I is the final argument to saturate the predicate and use <e,<l,ct:» as
the type for intransitive SLPs. A few of the rules of composition would differ, but the two approaches are
about equally simple. The one I show here is slighUy simpler.
4
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Simple anaphoric

pas~

~

AT Ax['T(dti)(x) & REL (dtj' d\) ; Ap 3tR [t R< IS & d\ = tR &'pJ],
where d\ is novel and dtj is familiar.

In (38) and (39), ts indicates speech time and is left free since it will be bound by context
The reference time tR is bound by an existential quantifier. In illustrating this proposal, I
assume that all tense and aspect information is available at a single syntactic node.
Obviously there are complex issues involved in the composition of aspect and this proposal
would ultimately need to be integrated into such a system.
In this proposal, any object argument of a SLP composes with the predicate's head
as its flrst argument Tense, if present, composes next, resulting in something of type
<e,cc> which can then compose with the subject Small clauses, like the perceptual reports
shown in (3) and (4), contain no tense so an additional composition rule is needed to allow
the subject and predicate to compose:
(40)

Small Clause Composition
a.
Syntax. If a is of type <S,<<S,<e,cc»,CC» and 0 is of type <l,<e,cc»,
then f(a,o) is of type </,cc>.
b.
Semantics. If a is of type <s,<<S,<e,cc»,cc» and 0 is of type
<l,<e,cc», and a and 0 translate into a' and 0' respectively, then f(a,o)
translates into Al [a'{ Ao'(l))].

This results in the following interpretation for Robin saw John leave:

(41)

a. Robin saw John leave.
b. Ap[see'(r, AI(leave(l)(j)], d') & 3tR [~ < IS & d'

=tR & 'pJ]

In such expressions, the event time of the perceived event (described in the small clause) is
inherited from the event time of perception in the matrix clause. The following meaning
postulate accomplishes this:
(42)

MP: For all a of type <<i,cc>,<l,<NP,cc»>, ~ of type e, "( of type <l,ce>, and
o of type el' interpreted as a', W, y, and 0' respectively, [a' (W, y, 0') ~
a,' CW,
0')].

reo'),

The formula below is the result of applying the meaning postulate to (40b):
(43)

Ap[see' (r, leave,(d')(j), d') & 3~ [tR < IS & d' == tR &-p]]

My proposal, then is that SLPs are descriptions of temporal intervals and that
discourse markers are associated with those intervals. The discourse referent that the SLP
picks up can be introduced by discourse context, accommodation, or a dynamic adverb of
quantiflcation. Not all SLPs in a discourse pick up exactly the same temporal referent For
example, in Robin left the stare, went home, antijell asleep, there is at least an inference of
a progression in event times. Hinrichs (1986) discusses these issues in detail, concluding
with the following generalizations:

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/8
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The reference point of a discourse can be shifted by:
(a)
the Aktionsart of a main clause; accomplishments and achievements
introduce new reference points, while states, activities and events described
in the progressive do not
(b)
the use of temporal conjunctions.
(c)
the use of flexible anchoring adverbials and dependent adverbials.
(Hinrichs 1986)

Since SLPs can be either telic or atelic, the issue of shifting temporal reference is
independent of the ILP/SLP issues. For this reason, my analysis finesses these issues
using the relation REL in the interpretation of anaphoric past in (39). This is also the
reason (39) includes two temporal discourse markers. Thus, SLPs combine the
characteristic of a definite description, that picks up a previously established referent, with
the ability of an indefinite to introduce a new referent
So far I have not said much about tense with !LPs. Certainly ILPs occur in tensed
clauses! I have claimed that tense is used to locate the event time of SLPs, but it cannot do
the same thing for !LPs since !LPs, by assumption, do not have event time. Consistent
with the discussion of (34) above, I propose that tense with !LPs serves to locate the time
at which a propositional content of an utterence is to be evaluated. As before, I illustrate
this with the simple past:
(45)

Sim pie pastn.p

6.

Consequences

=:)

The first consequence of this proposal is that we have an accowlt of the donkey
effects involving SLPs:
(46)

a. A woman woke up. She turned on the light (=33b)
b. AP [woman(x) & woke-up (d'l) (x) & 3ta[ta < Is & d\ = tR
& turn-on-light (d';! (x) & REL (d\, d'2) & 3ta[tR< Is & d'z = ta & Vp] ] ]

The second consequence is that we can provide a way out of a problem for
compositionality with perceptual reports and augmented absolutes. Carlson's (1977)
account of the ILP/SLP distinction was based on sorting the set of entities into stages,
objects, and kinds, with the sort individual consisting of the union of the object and kind
sorts. His account is thus built on the type-theoretic distinction below:
(47)

SLP

<e'1>
.'

ILP

<e',z>

In Carlson (1977), perceptual reports are analyzed as having tripartite structures:
(48)

VP

v--J;-xp
More recent work in syntaX has argued that the NP and XP (the description of the
perceived event) should be analyzed as a single constituent (Higginbotham 1983, Pollard &
Sag 1994). But such an analysis is not possible with Carlson's type-assignment: it is easy
to see that the distinction between !LPs and SLPs will be lost once the predicate composes
with its subject argument
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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The type-theoretic distinction assumed in this paper provides a solution to this.
Since SLPs have an extra temporal argument, the type-theoretic distinction remains evident
until tense supplies the discourse marker to fill it We can provide the following type
assignment to the perceptual report form of see and this allows it only to compose with
small clauses that contain a SLP, as illustrated in (50):5

(49)

see

«I,cc>,<I,<e,cc»>

(50)

*

V'

-----------

V
I
see

~

/"-....
a

-----------

SC </'ee>

NP
chair

V'

SC <cc>
~
NP
ll..P <e,ce>

V

I

SLP <1,<e,cc»
I

see

/"-....
a

available

I

chair

wooden

Although I do not provide an account of the interpretations of augmented absolutes here
(see Fernald in press), it is clear that some way is needed to distinguish between PPs that
contain ILPs from those that contain SLPs (recall the contrast in interpretation they show in
(10-11) and (12-13». My account provides such a mechanism:
CP

CP

(51)

---------------/"-....

PP

---------------

PP

CP

P

CP

~
/"-....
P
SC <cc>
~
NP
ll..P <e,ce>

~

SC <I,cc>
~
NP
SLP <1,<e,ce»

A final consequence of this proposal (also a consequence of Kratzer 1989) is that time is
used differently in propositions based on SLPs than it is in propositions based on ILPs.
This is because time is a constituent within any SLP-based proposition but not within an
ILP-based proposition. The chart in (52) indicates that sentences containing SLPs and
ILPs both potentially correspond to different propositions depending on the time at which
the sentence is uttered. However, how the different propositions are gotten potentially
differs in the two cases.
(52)

Sentence

SLP

Content

-------

Proposition

5 A NELS panicipant pointed out that see can take a full clause complement (Robin saw thaI the dishes
had been washed / Robin saw thaI Pal was sman) and so the type «I,cC>,<e,cc» must also be available
for it. The see in this sentence clearly does not involve direct perception, unlike the uses of see we have
been discussing. I assume that the two are distinguished from each other in the lexicon since the version of
see that entails direct perception cannot be used with a full clause complement
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!O3

•
ILP

------- .

I use the term content to pick out everything in a proposition except for its evaluation time.
Since time is at issue within a SLP-based proposition, it must be fixed before the content is
gotten. Thus, each SLP-based sentence potentially corresponds to multiple contents. For
example, in identifying the content of the sentence Robin kicked the trashcan it is
necessary to identify just what time the speaker is talking about Once this content is
established, which proposition is expressed is already determined. ll.P-based sentences, on
the other hand, do not have temporal arguments that need to be anchored before the content
can be identified. Thus, Robin is tilIJ. expresses the same content regardless of when it is
uttered. However, the time at which the content is evaluated yields multiple propositions
for the single content uttering the sentence sometime in 1998 expresses a different
proposition from uttering it in 1990.
Finally, it should be evident if the event time argument in a SLP-based sentence is
bound to an operator within the sentence, the result will have the temporal properties of
ILP-based sentences. This is because the determination of the event time is not dependent
on utterance context Clearly there are consequences to this that deserve further attention.
7.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have observed stage-level predicates exhibiting the characteristics
of donkey anaphora. Although the donkey effects with atemporal when adjuncts have been
discussed repeatedly in the literature, I am not aware of any previous claims that SLPs
exhibit the full range of donkey effects. The analysis presented here was based on
unexplored assumptions of Kratzer (1989) which are largely independent of the main thrust
of that paper. My account assumes a type-theoretic distinction between ILPs and SLPs in
which the extra temporal argument of SLPs is filled by a discourse marker. This analysis
provided a solution to the compositionality puzzle posed by perceptual reports and
augmented absolute adjuncts. Finally, I briefly explored the temporal consequences of
positing the distinction proposed here.
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